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WHAT FOLLOWS PUTTING REASON IN ITS PLACE?
"NOW VEE MAY PERHAPS TO BEGIN. YES?"*
SANFORD LEVINSON'
INTRODUCTION
As it happens, I read Dan Kahan and Donald Braman's extremely
interesting article' while on a plane, a venue where I get an increasing
percentage of my reading done these days. Air travel promotes a cer-
tain kind of intellectual serendipity, given the varying materials that
people bring with them to read while crossing the country. Upon fin-
ishing their decidedly academic article, I turned to the November 4,
2002, issue of The New Yorker. By uncanny coincidence, two of the arti-
cles in that issue are centrally relevant to the Kahan and Braman arti-
cle and, therefore, provide a structure for my response that the editors
of the University of Pennsylvania Law Review have been kind enough to
solicit.
All of these writings raise extremely important-and trouble-
some-questions about the role of rationality in human decision mak-
ing. Lawyers especially claim a devotion to abstract reason, whether
through the trope of the "reasonable" person or in the almost ritualis-
tic invocations of the notions of "stronger" and "weaker" arguments.
Beyond the legal academy, of course, the whole structure of Western
thought-at least since the Enlightenment, but with linkages going
back to Plato and Aristotle-has focused on the duty of intellectuals to
submit their claims to reason and to swear enmity to the enemies of
reason. It is, then, no small matter to challenge these notions.
After finishing Kahan and Braman, the first piece I read was a re-
view by Nicholas Lemann of Daniel Ellsberg's new book, Secrets.2 Ells-
berg, of course, is the person who leaked the Pentagon Papers, the Pen-
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tagon's "internal" history of the origins of the Vietnam War that was
compiled with the approval and cooperation of high-ranking Defense
Department officials. For many, including Ellsberg, the Pentagon's
own (secret) narrative of the events in question betrayed an astonish-
ing level of mendacity on the part of our country's leaders. As the war
continued even after the transition from Lyndon Johnson to Richard
Nixon, Ellsberg chose to convey the highly classified documents to re-
porters at The New York Times, among other publications . Those
newspapers famously published much of what Ellsberg gave them and
then successfully defended their decisions before the Supreme Court
against a vigorous attack by the executive branch."
Not surprisingly, much of Ellsberg's memoir is devoted to detail-
ing his motives for almost certainly violating the law. As Lemann
notes, though, there are deep connections between Ellsberg's argu-
ments in Secrets and those on display in another recent, though far
more esoteric, publication-his doctoral dissertation submitted to the
Harvard economics department in 1962, entitled Risk, Ambiguity and
Decision.'
Ellsberg was part of a generation of extremely brilliant analysts
who devoted their intellectual energies to constructing more rational
processes of decision making, particularly under conditions of ambi-
guity or incomplete information. Crucial to Ellsberg's outlook-and
his ultimate decision to leak the documents-was his belief, as Le-
mann writes, "that bad decisions were the product of inadequate in-. ,7
formation. Thus, Ellsberg was initially confident that presidents, in-
cludingJohn F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson, would necessarily have
made better decisions had they only received more accurate informa-
tion. This conclusion, of course, is a version of the Platonic conceit
that bad action betrays a deficiency of knowledge since no rational be-
ing would choose to act in dubious ways. Rationality, from this per-
3 See ELLSIBERG, supra note 2, at 365-75 (discussing Ellsberg's decision to deliver
the I'entagon Papers to The New York Times).
In that decision, New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 719 (1971),
known as The Pentagon Papers Case, the Court held that the executive branch did not
meet its buyrden of justifying the restraint of expression. See genoeally DAVID
RUDENSTINE, THiE DAY THE PPrSSES STOPPEi): A HISTOm' OF TE. PE, NTA CON PAIPEIS
CASt (1996) (outlining the case's precipitating events and procedural history).
5 Ellsberg's prosecution was ultimately dismissed because of the Nixon administra-
tion's egregious misconduct with regard to its procurement of evidence against him.
RUDENSTINE, sitpra note 4, at 326.
1i The dissertation was later published in book form as DANIEL ELLSBERG, RISK,
AMBIGUITY AND) DECISION (2001).
7 Lenmann, supra note 2, at 99.
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spective, was especially to be expected of public officials, particularly
with regard to such basic issues as war and peace. As Lemann writes:
For Ellsberg the shattering revelation of the Pentagon Papers was that the
American Presidents who made decisions about Vietnam had actually
been well informed. Nobody was lying to them about the probability of
success of American engagement, and they engaged anyway. All this
contradicted not only Ellsberg's own explanation for mistaken judg-
ments but a whole way of seeing the world, in which if decision-makers
can be given good information they will make rational choices.8
Ellsberg's disillusionment, though, was only partial. Perhaps
American leaders were less devoted to rational decision making than
he thought, but he was a sufficiently good democrat to have faith in
"the people." Surely his fellow Americans would turn against the war
once they realized the misleading nature of many claims being made
on its behalf. Knowing the truth would set them free-at least to re-
ject an intellectually corrupt ruling elite. Thus, the leaking is best in-
terpreted as an attempt to inform the ultimate sovereign-"We the
People"-about what had been done in our name. The Pentagon Pa-
pers did not per se destroy Ellsberg's commitment to rationalistic deci-
sion theory. "[I]n leaking the Papers to the press," Lemann writes, "he
was simply changing jurisdictions, trading in a faith that perfectly in-
formed Presidents will make rational decisions for a faith that a per-
fectly informed public will force rational decisions on misguided
Presidents."' But Lemann suggests that Ellsberg's help in "providing
the public with complete information didn't have the effect that Ells-
berg expected."' The war continued as if nothing had happened,
with ever more carnage and destruction in its wake.
Not surprisingly, Lemann links his discussion about the Vietnam
War to the current debate about Iraq, where many of us believe that
the Bush administration is making decisions that are potentially even
worse than those made by their predecessors forty years ago. Learned
articles are published attacking the empirical premises of the Bush
policy in the hope that they will affect political leaders and members
of the mass public to whom the leaders are ultimately accountable.
But, of course, no retreat from aggressive tactics seems to be happen-
ing; moreover, whatever else may be said about the November 2002
elections, they certainly do not manifest a revulsion by the American
public about the prospect of a war that is likely to be disastrous and
1 Id.
1 /d.
10 d.
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costly in every imaginable way even if, as appears likely at this time
(March 21, 2003), the United States "wins" the opening battles and
seizes control of Iraq.
One explanation for this response, of course, is that it is we, the
opponents of the policy, who are wrong: we are the ones who are best
described as obdurate and, indeed, irrational, in refusing to change
our views-perhaps because we hesitate to credit the possibility that a
"Texas cowboy" could be correct in his views about foreign policy.
This explanation, obviously, remains within the fold of classical ra-
tional-decision theory. The polarities are simply shifted with regard to
what, indeed, is the "rational" thing to do.
Lemann, however, suggests that it is the model of rational deci-
sion making embraced by Ellsberg that is fundamentally flawed.
"[T]here is another explanation for the failure of accurate informa-
tion to produce a single, rational outcome: the decision-makers are
making value judgments about how important the goal is and how
high a price they are willing to pay to achieve it."" And, of course,
there are almost always multiple goals, with varying prices, to further
complicate any notion of "rational" decision making. "In the end,"
Lemann concludes,
the Vietnam War can't be reduced to a problem of miscalctIlated prob-
ability. It is of the utmost importance right now that we understand that
the decision to go to war is ideological, not informational: the reason
people disagree vehemently about war in Iraq is not that the facts on the
ground or the true prospects of American military success are being kept
hidden. What they disagree about is under what conditions and by what
means the United States should try to affect the governance of other
cotuntries. Its not whalt we know but what we believe in that mnakes all the differ-
12
eneCe.
The other remarkable article in the November 4 issue of The New
Yorker is by the late W.G. Sebald, who in A Natural History of Destruction
wrote about the havoc visited upon German cities during World War
It, especially the 1943 firebombing of Hamburg. '"' Such raids were
part of a policy initiated by the British in 1942 "to destroy the morale
of the enemy civilian population and, in particular, of the industrial
workers.""' There were, both then and now, many criticisms of this
policy. Some have emphasized its arguable immorality insofar as civil-
It.
12 Id. (emphasis added).
W.G. Sebald, A Natural History of Desit ction, NEWYORKER, Nov. 4, 2002, at 66.
Id. at 69.
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ians essentially became the primary targets of attack; others have
pointed to its inefficacy, inasmuch as morale was remarkably unaf-
fected and, in addition, other targets might have been more valuable
militarily or, as with the bombing of rail lines to Auschwitz, more pro-
ductive in terms of humanitarian benefit. In any event, whatever ex-
planations can be offered by historians for the continuance of urban
bombing raids scarcely fit the models of rationalistic decision theory.
Sir Arthur Harris, whose nickname was "Bomber"-and not only be-
cause he was Commander-in-Chief of Bomber Command-"inflexibly
supported his strategy even when it was obviously not working. ' "In
fact," writes Sebold, "there is much to suggest that, in Harris, a man
had risen to the head of Bomber Command who.., liked destruction
for its own sake .... Sir Arthur Harris's position was unassailable be-
cause of his unlimited interest in destruction. '"l
I. RATIONAL DECISION MAKING
Kahan and Braman, like Lemann, Ellsberg, and Sebald, are essen-
tially joined in raising absolutely fundamental questions about the
ways that "we," whether as individuals or political institutions or, ulti-
mately, as a mass political public, make our decisions. That is, to what
extent does "reason" genuinely explain our behavior, or is it, as David
Hume suggested, simply "the slave of the passions"? To paraphrase
(and undoubtedly dilute) Mae West's immortal response to somebody
who gasped "my goodness" upon seeing her diamonds, "Goodness
had nothing to do with it,' I am tempted to say that the meaning de-
rived from all of these authors is that "reason" has little, or nothing, to
do with the choices we actually make. Instead, our decisions are far
better explained as the result of "values," "ideologies," or "cultural
commitments" than as neutral and detached responses, based on a
15 Id. at 70.
16 Id. As a constitutional lawyer, I am reminded of Justice Powell's repeated at-
tempts to distinguish policies that were adopted "because of," rather than "in spite of,"
their unfortunate consequences on racial minorities. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481
U.S. 279, 280 (1987) (requiring petitioners to prove that a law was enacted "because of
an anticipated racially discriminatory effect"). Were Harris a southern sheriff charged
with adopting policies "because of" the misery it would bring on African Americans, he
would clearly be convicted, at least if Sebald's description of his psychology is correct.
17 2 DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE AND DIALOGUES CONCERNING
NATURAl. RELIGION bk. II, pt. I1, § iii (T.H. Green & T.H. Gose eds., Longmans,
Green & Co. 1890) (1739).
18 NiCi AFTER NIGHT (Paramount Pictnes 1932), quoted in BARTLETI'S FAMILIAR
QUOTATIONS 736 (Justin Kaplan ed., 17th ed. 2002).
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common metric of rationality, to "data" or "evidence." Kahan and
Braman's very title, More Statistics, Less Persuasion, is a self-conscious
mockery of the significance of what is ordinarily taken by many people
to be a sine qua non of "rational argument" (though I shall note pres-
ently that their article is internally self-refuting on this point). Re-
gardless of whatever else persuades, they strongly assert, statistics or
other empirical work does not.
Thus, the central thrust of Kahan and Braman's piece is that "cul-
tural identity" remains the primary determinant of peoples' differing
views about gun regulation." What this means, among other things, is
that "there is little reason to think that recourse to empirics can shield
us from the conflict generated by clashing worldviews. 2 11 Only the na-
ive, then, could have expected Bomber Harris to change his mind
upon being informed that the devastation of Germany's cities was not
having the consequences some had hoped. Similarly, it would have
signified naive innocence if one believed that Lyndon Johnson would
decide to become the first American president to be perceived as los-
ing a war upon being informed that the war was in fact not being won.
Going from the sublime to the ridiculous, one scarcely sees "reason"
as having anything to do with explaining Bill Clinton's unfathomably
reckless behavior concerning Monica Lewinsky.
I will not attempt to dispute Kahan and Braman's central point
about the relationship between cultural norms, including attitudes
toward risks, and substantive positions relating to the issue of gun con-
trol. I do not have the professional training to challenge their statisti-
cal analyses. Perhaps more to the point is the fact that their basic ar-
guments feel right to me. As someone who has dabbled in the gun
control debate for over a decade,2 ' I am well aware of the rigidity of
that debate and the remarkable rarity with which people identified
with one side or the other change their minds about issues under dis-
cussion.
With respect to the intractability of the gun debate, one might be
tempted to adopt Matthew Arnold's evocation of "ignorant armies
19 See Kahan & Braman, supra note 1, at 1318 ("The only philosophically cogent
way to resolve the gun control controversy is to address explicitly, through democratic
deliberations, the question of what stance the law should take toward the competing
cultural visions that animate the gUtn control debate.").
20 Id. at 1320.
See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Secon Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637,
639-59 (1989) (addressing the pertinence of the constitutionally privileged "right to
bear arns" to today's political struggles).
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clash [ing] by night,,, 22 except that it misses the all-important point,
which I believe is an important aspect of Kahan and Braman: neither
the National Rifle Association (NRA) nor members of procontrol or-
ganizations can truly be described as "ignorant." Rather, as Kahan
and Braman convincingly show, those groups respond to evidence
quite differently in accordance to different risk preferences and over-
all cultural attitudes.
To someone who begins with the belief that guns are simply evil
with no redeeming social value, it is irrelevant that far more children
die as the consequence of choosing to go swimming than from acci-
dental gun injuries . 2  To people, on the other hand, who see the pri-
vate possession of firearms as a constitutive part of American culture
(and, furthermore, an important way of guarding themselves against
criminal predators or, more grandly, protecting American freedom
against potential tyrants) , the costs undoubtedly attached to such
possession (and no one is deluded enough to suggest that there are no
costs at all) are well worth paying. Almost no one, for example, be-
lieves that we should stop building bridges or skyscrapers simply be-
cause it can be statistically predicted that X individuals will give their
lives in the process of erecting them. Even more surely, few are those
who would support a twenty-five-mile-per-hour speed limit because
that would undoubtedly save thousands of lives, though, obviously,
such a policy would be "rational" for someone committed only to the
value of saving lives otherwise lost in automobile accidents.
The fact that gun control, like abortion, smoking, teenage sexual-
ity, and, for that matter, speed limits, is an aspect of America's "cul-
ture wars" makes prospects for "rational" solution quite dim, at least if
one accepts the young Daniel Ellsberg's notions of "rationality." Of
course, these are not uniquely American problems. One need think
only of the Indian-Pakistani dispute over the fate of Kashmir, which,
among all world conflicts, is probably most likely to result in the first
nuclear exchange since Nagasaki in 1945. That such an exchange
would be "irrational"-indeed, "Linatic"-may have all too little to tell
22 MAII.Ew ARNOLD, Dover Beach, in POEMS: LNRIC AND ELEGIAC POEMS 63, 64
(1923).
23 See JAMES B. JACOBS, CAN GUN CONTROL WORK? 5 (2002) ("[l]n 1997, only 40
children under age 5 were killed in firearms accidents. That same year, 600 children
under 5 died in drowning accidents.... Likewise, the numbers of fatal accidents in-
volving children Under 15 included 1,050 drownings... and 220 firearms deaths.").
I, of course, am not even referring to the alleged roots of a preference for guns
in desires to maintain a certain notion of masculinity.
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us about the actual odds of its occurring. Such is the power of "cul-
ture" or "ideology."
And it is vital to realize that all of us are in the grips of "culture"
and "ideology." Kahan and Braman most definitely do not make the
jejune call for a "liberation" from "culture" or "ideology" and con-
comitant movement into the impersonal Elysian (and enlightened)
fields of pure reason. There is no such world, and they know it.
There are only the "clashing armies," and what Kahan and Braman ask
is how it is that one can arrange truces-and perhaps even mutually
advantageous treaties-among them once one accepts that none will
be able to force its opponents into unconditional surrender by sheer
force of argument. Few questions are more important or have greater
implications for issues ranging far beyond gun control.
II. WHAT FOLLOWS THE CRITIQUE OF "REASON"?
Despite Kahan and Braman's provocative (and plausible) argu-
ments, I was reminded when I finished their article of the famous re-
mark of Dr. Spielvogel, Portnoy's psychiatrist in Philip Roth's classic
Pomoy's Complaint, ' itself an unsparing look at the actualities of our
complex culture(s) and the uncertain prospects for their synthesis.
The good doctor, after hearing the unending catalogue of complaints
about his patient's parents, says, "So.... Now vee may perhaps to be-
gin. Yes?
'2 6
What is most disappointing about the otherwise praiseworthy arti-
cle by Kahan and Braman is the ultimate banality of its sentiments-
not to mention a certain measure of self-contradiction-as to what
message should be drawn from their analysis. Thus, they describe them-
selves as delivering "exhortation to academics to apply themselves to
the creation of a new expressive [rather than, presumably, "empiric"]
idiom, one designed to accommodate respectful cultural deliberations
over gun control."2 "Exhortation" is, alas, all too accurate a descrip-
tion:
In order to civilize the gun debate, then, moderate citizens-the ones
who are repulsed by cultural imperialism of all varieties-must come out
from behind the cover of consequentialism and talk through their corn-
peting visions of the good life without embarrassment. They must, in
the spirit of genuine democratic deliberation, appeal to one another for
2- Pi-iPir ROriT, PORTNOY'S COMPLAINT 274 (1969).
2 / d.
27 Kahan & Braman, supra note 1, at 1295.
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understanding and seek policies that accommodate their respective
211
worldviews.
Several things are worth noting about this view of politics. I begin
with the self-satisfied and, presumably, self-referential paeon to "mod-
erate citizens" who "are repulsed by cultural imperialism of all varie-
ties." One might first ask how many readers of this journal consider
themselves "immoderate citizens" who embrace "cultural imperial-
ism," at least at the conscious level. Our culture often seems to use
terms like "immoderate" as a pejorative and "moderate" (or "centrist")
as a compliment. This certainly explains the common rhetorical
trope of trying to suggest that there are two equally unacceptable ends
of a spectrum and that one is adopting the "reasonable" via media.
(One recent name for this, in American politics, is "triangulation.") A
problem with any such tropes, of course, is getting agreement on what
counts as the unacceptable (and presumably culturally "imperialist")
extremes. I am old enough, for example, to remember when white
southern "moderates" defined themselves by rejecting the "extremists
on both sides," i.e., the Ku Klux Klan and the NAACP. In an even ear-
lier era, "moderates" were those who might bestir themselves on be-
half of "gradual emancipation" (say, in a half-century or so, with full
compensation, of course, for the slave owners being deprived of "their
property") as against the "slavocrats" on one hand and the Garrisoni-
ans devoted to "immediate emancipation" on the other. Obviously,
less tendentious (and far more admirable) examples of "moderation"
could be given, but the point should be obvious: what is crucial is not
the label but the actual structure of alternatives and the appeal that
they might have for the analyst.
Might it not be suggested, moreover, that "moderation" can itself
be a form of "cultural imperialism"? Consider in this context Yeats's
oft-quoted lines:
Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold;
Mere anarchy is loosed Upon the world,
The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere
The ceremony of innocence is drowned;
The best lack all conviction, while the worst
, 29
Are full of passionate intensity.
28 d. at 1321-22.
29 WILLIAM BUTLER YEATS, The Second Coming, in TinL COLLE(I'ED POEMS OF W.B.
YEATS 203, 203 (definitive ed. 1956).
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Though critical of the "passionate intensity" of anarchists, Yeats
scarcely seems to endorse "lack of conviction." Indeed, his poem is
often interpreted as a call for moderates to develop their own "pas-
sionate intensity" that can be used to confront, and ultimately to de-
feat, the "blood-dimmed tide[s]" that are "loosed" on the world. Most
of us believe that the world would be better off if at least some social
movements were eliminated-by force of arms if necessary-and it is
hard to see how those we (justifiably) wish to extirpate can view us as
anything other than "imperialists."
Finally, is it "immoderate" to believe that "moderation in the pur-
suit ofjustice is no virtue? All that one can cogently say, I believe, is
that "To every thing there is a season, and a time to every purpose un-
der the heaven .... ":" Thus, while there are most certainly times for
moderation, there are just as certainly times for immoderation. Pub-
lic monuments are rarely built to honor those who chose "modera-
tion" as their life's path.
Kahan and Braman's purpose is not only to offer a discussion of
the debate about gun control. It is also attached to a larger agenda,
which is the criticism of what they term "liberalism.0 2 Their version of
"liberalism" appears to exhibit little acceptance of deep cultural cleav-
ages-at least with regard to open cultural debate in the public
square-and wishes to "cleanse public discourse of appeals to con-
tested cultural views altogether.""' They appear to apply Michel Fou-
cault's dismissal of professionalism as "the monologue of reason"'" to
liberalism as such, with that "monologue". ultimately consisting of ap-
peals to empirical data that, its proponents believe, should intellectu-
ally force any honest onlooker to only one conclusion. Needless to
say, there are versions of liberalism-or, more to the point, of En-
lightenment philosophy-that can be reduced to such naive notions.
30 This concept, Of course, is taken f[om the acceptance speech by Senator Barry
Goldwater at the Republican National Convention in 1964. BARTLE Fr's FAMILIAR
QUOTATIONS, supra note 18, at 355 n.I. Justin Kaplan notes that Goldwater's comment
is similar to one made by Thomas Paine, one of the instigators of the American Revo-
lution: "Moderation in temper is always a virtue; but moderation in principle is always
a vice." BARTLE't-F'S FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS, stupra note 18, at 355 (quoting THOMAS
PAINE, THE RIGHTS OF MAN pt. 11, ch. 5 (1792)).
41 Ecclesiastes 3:1 (emphasis omitted).
42 Kahan & Braman, supra note I, at 1323.
'3 Id. at 1322.
44 MICHEL FOUCAULT, MADNESS AND CIVILIZATION: A HISTORY OF INSANITY IN THE
AGE OF REASON, at xi (Richard Howard trans., 1965) (1961).
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But, to put it mildly, there are many other versions of liberalism as
well.
Perhaps it is more fair to say that many proponents of the "liberal
project" share a fear of what James Madison so notably called "fac-
tions,"' and that liberalism is devoted to a perhaps unsuccessful effort
to detail how legitimate public decisions can be made in spite of the
significant sociocultural fragmentation. But this, of course, seems to
be Kahan and Braman's own project. On the basis of the content, if
not the rhetoric, of their article, one could easily describe them as
quintessentially "liberal" in their call for deliberation based on the
mutual respect of quite different worldviews. Their "conclusion pre-
supposes that expressive debate in law can be simultaneously perti-
nent and tolerant.' ' ' They quite explicitly endorse the notion of
"democratic deliberation."7 Much of the ever-expanding literature
on "deliberative democracy" has been written by those who are proud
to identify themselves as liberals.i8 Ironically enough, in a piece de-
voted to the importance of "playing fair" with competing worldviews,
there may be a notable unfairness in reducing a rich and complex po-
litical philosophy to their own self-serving caricature.
Kahan and Braman might respond, of course, that I am being
more than a bit rhetorical myself. After all, they are scarcely Pollyana-
ish in their vision of the world. They are well aware of "the difficulty
of adapting this strategy of pluralistic expressive deliberations to the
gun control issue.""' The best they can do is to express a very cautious
optimism based on experiences in France and Germany with regard to
religion and abortion and with Native Americans with regard to the
disposition of tribal artifacts.") Conceding this, I continue to believe
that the article, for all of its acknowledged strengths, basically avoids
any examples of how their dialogue might actually occur. What
"compromise" proposals, taking account of the cultural differences
that they detail, would they proffer to the contending sides? And why
would they expect acceptance, especially given Eugene Volokh's dem-
See, e.g., THE FEDERALIsi No. 10 (James Madison) (discussing factions and de-
fining them as groups inimical to the public good).
Kahan & Braman, supra note 1, at 1322.
37 Id. at 1318.
For a notable example, see A,\,y GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY'
AND DISAGREEMENT (1996).
39 Kahan & Braman, supra note 1, at 1323.
40 See id. at 1322 (noting "examples of communities successfully negotiating cul-
ture-in fused controversies").
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onstration in a brilliant recent article in the Harvard Law Review,4' that
it is often altogether "rational" for groups to reject proffered "com-
promises," even if the proposal makes a certain amount of sense, if
they cogently view acceptance as significantly increasing the likelihood
that objectionable policies would later be adopted. Indeed, Volokh
repeatedly turns to the gun control issue for examples.2
Further difficulties suggest themselves to anyone who actually tries
to imagine the dialogues and conversations that Kahan and Braman
call for. Start with a basic point: how much do they genuinely wish to
repudiate the use of empirical argument? They cannot cogently ar-
gue that empirical argument is per se irrelevant to the discussion of
public policy, for, as I have earlier suggested, that would be to engage
in self-contradiction. Their article is saturated with empirical argument, in-
cluding impressive multiple regression analyses designed to tease out
exactly how much culture explains views on gun control as against
other variables. The purpose of their utilization of this impressive
technical apparatus is obviously to get us to change our minds about
how best to approach an important issue of public policy. They can-
not, therefore, logically be arguing that "empirics" should be com-
pletely ignored, only that their empirics should be given pride of place
over other scholars' empirics. Fair enough, but this is far different
from what is suggested by their flamboyant title.
Furthermore, how much do they actually wish to repudiate any
and all of the consequentialist-oriented argument they are so keen to
criticize? Can one really imagine cogent arguments about guns that
never refer to the potential consequences of one policy or another?
Consider, for example, debates about the treatments of breast or pros-
tate cancer. It is obvious that decisions as to, say, mastectomies or re-
moval of the prostate are bound up with far more than the (decidedly
uncertain) statistics about the actual contribution of either of these
treatments to one's life expectancy. Such decisions inevitably include
one's views about sexuality and other issues that could be described as
"cultural." A similar point could be made about almost any aspect of
contemporary medicine, including, of course, the advisability of offer-
ing persons an alternative to enduring what they view as unacceptable
levels of pain. No one should believe that there is a simple "fact of the
Eugene Volokh, h7e Mechanisms of the Slippely Slope, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1026
(2003).
-12See id. at 1033-38 (evaluating the routes by which gun registration may lead to
stronger gun control).
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matter" that dictates whether men and women should accept any
given medical treatment for serious illness.
Does this mean, however, that empirical evidence is irrelevant?
Should patients simply be asked about their values and their world-
views rather than shown, for example, the latest studies that suggest
that treatment A does seem to reduce the cancer in X percent of the
cases with Y side effects, as against a treatment B with different out-
comes? It is impossible to believe that Kahan and Braman would re-
ject the utility of such basic aspects of "evidence-based medicine" that
heavily rely on statistical argument. But If I am correct, they should
be equally unwilling to reject in toto the relevance of empirical data
with regard to guns. It is one thing-and a real contribution-to be
reminded that such evidence isn't everything; it is distinctly another-
and a contribution to the "know nothing" strands already present in
American culture-to suggest that it is nothing. Self-styled "moder-
ates" should especially take greater care than Kahan and Braman ex-
hibit in their article to emphasize that they are critical only of over-
reliance on empirical arguments.
Still, they might respond, at least some cultural arguments are in-
herently impervious to empirical argument, and in this they are surely
correct. Consider, for example, the design of flags or the placement
of public monuments.3 These are "expressive" to the core, and it is
indeed often hard to figure out what sorts of empirical data might be
relevant. One could look, perhaps, at public opinion polls in order to
determine likely public reaction to, say, renaming any public school in
44New Orleans originally named after slave owners or placing a statue
of Arthur Ashe on Richmond's Monument Avenue, the locale of
monuments to Confederate heroes.' A likely lesson, though, is that
one would find what social scientists would label a "U-Curve," in which
there would be strong partisans of each position (i.e., the status quo
on the one side versus the proposed change on the other). At that
point, Kahan and Braman's counsel is almost undoubtedly correct:
we must devise ways for those on opposite sides of a given culture war
to approach a peace table with each side receiving enough validation
43 See SANFORD LEVINSON, WRITTEN IN STONE: PUBLIC MONUMENTS IN CHANGING
SOCIETIES (1998) (cataloguing numerous public monuments and delving into their
social meaning).
44 See id. at 24 (noting the public debate which ensued after George Washington's
name was replaced following a school board's action prohibiting the naming of
schools after former slave owners).
45 See id. at 115-20 (discussing a similar debate Occurring over the racial and politi-
cal symbolism of statues).
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to bring about an acceptable new reality. This means, almost by defi-
nition, that one will have to refrain from the pleasure of denouncing
one's opponents as the scoundrels -they may well seem to be.
One might wonder, though, about the prevalence of what might
be termed "purely expressive" or even "predominantly expressive" po-
litical issues. It is important to be reminded that all issues have ex-
pressive dimensions, but surely, one can construct a spectrum of issues
depending on mixes of what might be termed "expressive" and "em-
pirico-consequentialist" aspects. Kahan, for example, has written no-
table articles on the expressive dimensions of criminal punishment;
he is an important proponent of public "shaming" as a mechanism of
punishment, perhaps even as an alternative to incarceration."' Is
there no sense in which his own prescriptions-as substitutes for our
present regimes of punishment-depend for their acceptability on the
empirical consequences that would attach? Would not one want to
know, for example, about the recidivism rate of those who are
"shamed" rather than "invisibly" incarcerated? If placing persons in
stocks or forcing them to wear scarlet letters on their clothing in fact
led to remarkable personal transformations and easier reintegration
as productive members of the social order, would we necessarily insist
on continuing to "lock them up"? I most certainly would not! Con-
comitantly, if research showed that "shaming sanctions" in fact
seemed to reinforce the hostility of convicted criminals to ordinary
society and, therefore, increased the likelihood of recidivism, might
Kahan not change his mind?
CONCLUSION
Kahan and Braman provide a vital reminder of the axiom that at-
tention to expressive dimensions of politics is a necessary condition of
any cogent political strategy involving practically any complex issue,
most certainly including firearms. What this means, by definition, is
that an approach devoted exclusively to certain kinds of empirico-
consequentialist argument will inevitably be of only minimal aid in
procuring any kind of social peace. Indeed, such an approach may
even make things worse inasmuch as it is perceived to exhibit a certain
kind of blindness to the controversies about worldviews that in fact
structure much of the public debate. But Kahan and Braman should
46 See Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHi. L. REv. 591,
631-52 (1996) (considering the potential of shaming penalties).
"NOW VEE MA Y PERHAPS TO BEGIN"
recall, as well, that expressive argument can almost never be a sufficient
condition for the presence of a serious politics.
I conclude with two final quotations. Perhaps Kahan and Braman
should be read as echoing John Keats's famous call for what he called
"Negative Capability, that is, when man is capable of being in uncertain-
ties, Mysteries, doubts, without any irritable reaching after fact & rea-1,7
son." However touched we might be by this poetic insight, it is ulti-
mately dangerous for anyone concerned to affect public policy to find
"irritable" the "reaching after fact & reason." Far better is F. Scott
Fitzgerald's comment, "The test of a first-rate intelligence is the ability
to hold two opposed ideas in the mind at the same time, and still re-
tain the ability to function. ,4 " There can, of course, be no doubt as to
the possession of "first-rate intelligence" by Kahan and Braman, and
one shotld indeed take their counsel that one must at the very same
time be aware of what empirical evidence can contribute and be cog-
nizant as well of its inevitable limitations with regard to arguments
that significantly turn on culture and other mysteries of the human
race.
7 Letter from John Keats to George and Tom Keats (Dec. 22, 1818), reprinted in
JOHN KEATS, SELECTED LETIERS 40, 41-42 (Robert Gittings ed., 2002).
F. Scori FrrZGERALD, THE CRACK-UP 69 (Edmund Wilson ed., 1964).
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